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IS NAFTA UP TO ITS GREEN EXPECTATIONS? EFFEC-
TIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE NORTH AMERI-
CAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
Beatriz Bugeda*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA)' between the governments of Mexico, Canada
and the United States went into effect. Together with this trade
agreement, the governments of the three countries entered into
a side agreement on the environment: the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).2  This
agreement, also known as the Environmental Side Agreement,
responded to some of the concerns of NAFTA critics.' Some
environmentalists believed NAFTA would promote environmen-
tally insensitive and uncontrolled growth, and others thought
the liberalization of trade would be used as a means to preempt
stringent domestic environmental regulations.4
Some environmentalists also feared that in order to obtain a
competitive advantage, polluting industries would move from a
* Professor of Law, Universidad Iberoamericana; member of the Leadership on
Environment and Development Program of the Rockerfeller Foundation (LEAD-Pro-
gram); former Head of the Mexico Liaison Office of the Commission for Environmen-
tal Cooperation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The author thanks the
Allen family and the students, staff, and faculty of the University of Richmond School
of law-Professor Joel Eisen in particular-for hospitality and support. My special
thanks to my friend Pedro Enrique Armendares for his helpful comments on this
article.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
3. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 714
(1995).
4. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON & ANDIR
BEAULiEU, THE ENVIRONmENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEmENTING THE
NEW CONTINENTAL LAw (1996).
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country with more stringent environmental regulations to one
with less developed environmental policies or lax enforcement.5
Mexico's enforcement capacities with regard to the environment
were questioned in comparison to the supposedly more effective
regulatory regimes of the other two countries participating in
NAFTA. Critics argued that the lower cost of environmental
compliance in Mexico would encourage businesses and investors
to relocate there.6
Some environmental groups felt this situation would force the
United States and Canada to lower their own environmental
enforcement standards to protect employment levels and the
health of their economies, thus creating a "race to the bottom"
of environmental regulations.! It was argued that this process
of downward harmonization of environmental standards would
have disastrous effects on the North American environment.'
In an attempt to address the criticisms of opponents to
NAFTA and the concerns of environmental groups, the govern-
ments of the three countries committed themselves to both
ensuring that their "laws and regulations provide for high lev-
els of environmental protection," and striving to "continue to
improve those laws and regulations."9 The NAFTA parties
reached a compromise under the NAAEC to foster cooperation
for the protection and improvement of the environment, and to
enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental
laws and regulations.."
To increase cooperation in conserving, protecting, and enhanc-
ing the North American environment, the three governments
established the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC).11 This institution, based in Montreal, is composed of
5. See Aradhana Kuma, Jean Milner & Annie Petsonk, The North American Free
Trade Association, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 116, 119-20 (Jacob
Werksman ed., 1996).
6. See Kal Raustiala, International "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721, 723
(1996).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 3, at 1483.
10. See id. art. 1(a), (g).
11. See id. arts. 8-19, at 1485-89. Part Three of the NAAEC establishes the CEC,
and describes its structure and the functions of the three bodies that comprise it. See
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three different bodies: the Council, the Secretariat, and the
Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC)."2 The first two are
typical intergovernmental bodies, while the third, composed of
fifteen members from the different sectors of the three North
American countries,"3 constitutes one of the innovative aspects
of the NAAEC. The JPAC is responsible for creating a link
between the North American public and the other bodies of the
CEC, with the objective of promoting public participation in the
decision-making process of the organization.'4
The Council is the governing body of the CEC and is com-
prised of cabinet level representatives of the three countries. Its
functions are to "oversee the implementation and develop rec-
ommendations on the further elaboration of [the] Agreement,"
as well as to "address questions and differences that may arise
between the [NAFTA countries]." 5 As the CEC's executive
body, the Council is in charge of approving the CEC's annual
program and budget. 6 It also serves as the forum for discus-
sion of environmental matters among Mexico, Canada and the
United States.
The CEC's second body, the Secretariat, is the one that "pro-
vide[s] technical, administrative and operational support to the
Council and to the committees and working groups established
by the Council."" One of the most important functions of the
Secretariat is to prepare the CEC's annual report. This report
must cover the actions taken by each country in connection
with its obligations under the NAFTA agreement, including
information on each country's environmental enforcement activi-
ties. 9 After being reviewed by the Council, this document is
id.
12. See id. art. 8, at 1485.
13. See id. art. 16(1), at 1489.
14. See id. art. 16, at 1489. Other functions of the JPAC are to "provide advice to
the Council on any matter within the scope of this Agreement.. . and on the im-
plementation and further elaboration of this Agreement" and to "perform such other
functions as the Council may direct." Id. art. 16(4), at 1489.
15. Id. art. 10, at 1485.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id. art. 11, at 1487.
19. See id. arts. 11, 12, at 1487.
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made public, and it must include the "relevant views and infor-
mation submitted by [nongovernmental] organizations and per-
sons."
20
To enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environ-
mental laws and regulations, and the signers' regulations, the
signers promised to effectively enforce their environmental
laws.21 The signers established two mechanisms for this pur-
pose: the party-to-party dispute resolution process established in
Part V of the NAAEC, 22 and the Citizen's Submission process
contained in Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC.23
This article will begin with a brief examination of the dispute
resolution process established in Part V of the NAAEC. The
article then gives a more detailed description of the Citizen's
Submission process, highlighting the aspects of this procedure
that have proven to be controversial in the eyes of both nongov-
ernmental organizations and the parties to the NAAEC. Part
III of the article examines the first submission that has result-
ed in a factual record: the Cozumel Submission. Finally, some
brief conclusions are included.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS UNDER NAAEC
A. The Party-to-Party Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The most extensive section of the NAAEC deals with settle-
ment of disputes. The scheme that was agreed upon is common
to most international agreements. It begins with consultations,
continues with other means of conflict resolution, follows with
arbitration, and ends with sanctions and the suspension of
trade agreement benefits.'
The noteworthy aspect of this dispute resolution mechanism
is its limited scope. The mechanism is accessible only to
NAAEC parties and it is related to a "persistent pattern of
failure to effectively enforce environmental law."25 The term
20. Id. art. 12, at 1487.
21. See id. art. 1, at 1483.
22. See id. arts. 22-36, at 1490-94.
23. See id. arts. 14-15, at 1488-89.
24. See id. arts. 22-36, at 1490-94.
25. Id. art. 22, at 1490. For NAAEC's definition of the term "environmental law,"
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"persistent pattern" is defined in Article 45(1) of the NAAEC as
a "sustained or recurring course of action or inaction beginning
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement."26 As stat-
ed in Article 24, it is limited to "situation[s] involving
workplaces, firms, companies, or sectors that produce goods or
provide services .... ."" The NAAEC specifically refers to: (a)
goods or services that are traded between the territories of the
governments involved; or, (b) companies that compete in the
territory of the government against which the complaint has
been made, with goods or services produced or provided by
individuals from a different country.28 This is the only section
in the NAAEC in which there is a direct link between trade
and the environment.
If the governments in question do not arrive at a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the matter through consultations, or
through a special Council session, the Council may, "by a two-
thirds vote, convene an arbitral panel to consider the mat-
ter."29 The panel will present a report containing its "determi-
nation as to whether there has been a persistent pattern of fail-
ure by the government complained against to effectively enforce
its environmental law[s]." ° It will also present its recommen-
dation for the resolution of the dispute. The recommendation
will normally consist of an action plan for sufficiently remedy-
ing the pattern of nonenforcement."' If the disputing govern-
ment does not agree to the action plan, it can be subject to a
monetary enforcement assessment and, ultimately, to the sus-
pension of NAFTA benefits, except in Canada.32 In the case of
Canada, a special provision requires that enforcement be pro-
vided by domestic courts.3"
As the dispute resolution mechanism has not been triggered
yet by the parties to the NAAEC agreement, its efficiency in
see infra note 42.
26. Id. art. 45, at 1495.
27. Id. art. 24, at 1490.
28. See id.
29. Id. For more detail regarding the integration of this panel, see id. arts. 24-27,
at 1490-91.
30. Id. art. 31 (2)(b), at 1492.
31. See id. art. 31 (2)(c), at 1492.
32. See id. art. 36, at 1493.
33. See id. Annex 36A, at 1493, 1496-97.
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promoting effective enforcement of environmental law in the
three countries remains untested. Nonetheless, some legal ex-
perts have already identified some of its limitations. For exam-
ple, Pierre Marc Johnson and Andr6 Beaulieu point out that
"the dispute settlement procedure remains lengthy, cumber-
some, and full of legal uncertainties."34 They also argue that
[N]either the system of fines paid by the governments nor
the imposition of duties on the exports of the party com-
plained against seem a particularly appropriate way to allo-
cate the environmental costs of polluting activities. The
costs of the fines may well never be passed on to the pollut-
ing industries who benefited from lax enforcement."
Others argue that "the scope of the disputes that can be
reached . . . by the dispute resolution mechanism .. . is such
that many significant environmental issues will not fall within
it., 36
B. The Citizen's Submission Process
Perhaps the most important function of the Secretariat of the
CEC, and definitely the one that has captured the most atten-
tion of environmental groups, the private sector, and legal spe-
cialists in North America, is the function related to reviewing
submissions regarding enforcement matters, which is stipulated
in NAEEC's Articles 14 and 15."
It is through these articles that Canada, Mexico and the
United States established a procedure through which ordinary
citizens, environmental organizations, or even corporations can
complain to the Secretariat that one of the three countries is
not enforcing its environmental laws. The articles also provide
a mechanism for any citizen or group of citizens to make public
34. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 238.
35. Id.
36. J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation: A New Model for International Collaboration on Trade and Envi-
ronment, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 278, 302 (1994).
37. See NAAEC, supra note 2, arts. 14-15, at 1488-89.
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the fact that one of the three governments is not complying
with its obligations under the NAAEC. 5
This procedure, combined with the reports that the Secretari-
at can prepare pursuant to Article 13 of NAAEC, 39 provides
the only avenue within the NAFTA/NAAEC framework for
nongovernmental organizations to pursue their environmental
concerns. The procedure is complemented by a series of guide-
lines that were proposed to the North American public through
various meetings held in the three countries by the JPAC. °
To summarize the procedure, anyone residing in or any non-
governmental group established in North America41 can bring
38. See id.
39. See id. art. 13, at 1487-88. This article enables the Secretariat of the CEC to
"prepare a report for the Council on any matter within the scope of the annual pro-
gram." Id. at 1487. One interesting aspect of this kind of report is that nongovern-
mental organizations or individuals can ask the Secretariat to prepare a report on
any environmental matter about which they are concerned. If the environmental mat-
ter is related to the annual program, the Secretariat can prepare a report without
the Council's authorization. If the issue raised is not within the scope of the program,
the Council decides by a two-thirds vote if the report will be prepared. See id. art.
13, at 1488. An example of this type of report is the one developed by the Secretari-
at regarding the death of massive numbers of migratory birds which occurred in 1994
at the Silva Reservoir located in the Mexican state of Guanajuato. See Jay Tutchton,
The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement: It's Easy
to Use, But Does It Work?, 26 ENvTL. L. REP. 10031-32 n.13 (1996); CEC Secretariat
Report on the Death of Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir (1994-95) (visited Apr.
7, 1999) <http://www.cec.org/english/resources/publications/index.cfi>. Three environ-
mental groups requested the preparation of the report: the Mexican Center of Envi-
ronmental Law, the International Group of One Hundred, and the National Audubon
Society. See id.
40. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Guidelines for Submissions on
Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (visited Oct. 19, 1998) <http:11209.167.49.172search/data/
english/citizenlguideO8.cfm-format=1.htm> [hereinafter Guidelines]. The JPAC held
public hearings on its Draft Procedures for Public Submissions on July 31, 1995, in
Ottawa; on August 3, 1995, in Washington, D.C.; and on August 7, 1995, in Mexico
City. See id.
41. According to NAAEC, the term "non governmental organization" means: "any
scientific, professional, business, nonprofit, or public interest organization or associa-
tion which is neither affiliated with, nor under the direction of, a government."
NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 45, at 1495. "Territory" is defined to mean
(a) with respect to Canada, the territory to which its customs laws apply,
including any areas beyond the territorial seas of Canada within which,
in accordance with international law and its domestic law, Canada may
exercise rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natural
resources;
(b) with respect to Mexico,
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a submission against any one of the three governments alleging
that it is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws.
(i) the states of the Federation and the Federal District;
(ii) the islands, including the reefs and keys, in adjacent seas;
(iii) the island of Guadalupe and Revillagigedo situated in the Pacific
Ocean;
(iv) the continental shelf and the submarine shelf of those islands,
keys, and reefs;
(v) the waters of the territorial seas, in accordance with international
law, and its interior maritime waters;
(vi) the space located above the national territory, in accordance with
international law; and
(vii) any areas beyond the territorial seas of Mexico within which, in
accordance with international law, including the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, and its domestic law, Mexico may
exercise rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natu-
ral resources; and
(c) with respect to the United States,
(i) the customs territory of the United States, which includes the 50
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico;
(ii) the foreign trade zones located in the United States and Puerto
Rico; and
(iii) any areas beyond the territorial seas of the United States within
which, in accordance with international law and its domestic law, the
United States may exercise rights with respect to the seabed and
subsoil and their natural resources.
Id. Annex 45, at 1498.
42. See id. art. 14, at 1488. The term "environmental law" is defined as:
(a) [Any statute or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof, the prima-
ry purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the preven-
tion of a danger to human life or health, through[:]
(i) the prevention, abatement, or control of the release, discharge, or
emission of pollutants or environmental contaminants[;]
(ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, sub-
stances, materials, and wastes, and the dissemination of information
related thereto[;] or
(iii) the protection of wild flora and fauna, including endangered spe-
cies, their habitat, and specifically protected natural areas in the
Party's territory, but does not include any statute or regulation, or
provision thereof, directly related to worker safety or health.
(b) For greater certainty, the term "enviroumental law" does not include
any statute or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of
which is managing the commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence
or aboriginal harvesting, of natural resources.
Id. art. 45(2), at 1495.
NAAEC also establishes that:
1. For purposes of this Agreement: A Party has not failed to "effectively
enforce its environmental law" or to comply with Article 5(1) in a partic-
ular case where the- action or inaction in question by agencies or official
of that Party:
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of inves-
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The Secretariat may consider the submission if- (a) it is in
writing;' (b) it "clearly identifies the person or organization
making the submission;"' (c) it provides sufficient information
to allow the Secretariat to review the matter;' (d) it "appears
to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than harassing in-
dustry;" 6 and (e) it indicates that the matter has been commu-
nicated in writing to the relevant authorities" in the country in
question.47
tigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, or compliance matters; or
(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforce-
ment in respect of other' environmental matters determined to have
higher priorities.
Id. art. 45(1), at 1495 (emphasis in original).
43. See id. art. 14(1)(a), at 1488. The languages designated for submissions are
English, French, or Spanish. See also Guidelines, supra note 40, § 3.2.
44. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1)(b), at 1488. Article 11 of the NAAEC also
provides that:
The Secretariat shall safeguard:
(a) from disclosure information it receives that could identify a non
governmental organization or person making a submission if the per-
son or organization so requests or the Secretariat otherwise considers
it appropriate; and
(b) from public disclosure any information it receives from any non
governmental organization or person where the information is desig-
nated by that non governmental organization or person as confidential
or proprietary.
Id. art. 11(8), at 1487.
45. See id. art. 14(1)(c), at 1488. The submission guidelines provide that the sub-
mission "must contain a succinct account of the facts on which such an assertion [i.e.,
the non enforcement of environmental law] is based." Guidelines, supra note 40, § 5.3.
"Submissions should not exceed 15 pages of typed, letter-sized paper, excluding sup-
porting information." Id. § 3.3. "Any correspondence or written document(s) will be
considered a submission by the Secretariat if it contains the supporting information
necessary to enable the Secretariat, at the proper time, to assess the submission
based on the criteria listed in Article 14(1) of the Agreement." Id. § 3.6.
46. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1)(d), at 1488.
In making that determination, the Secretariat will consider such factors
as whether or not:
a. the submission is focused on the acts or omissions of a Party rather
that on compliance by a particular company or business; specifically if
the Submitter is a competitor that may stand to benefit economically
from the submission[;]
b. the submission appears frivolous.
Guidelines, supra note 40, § 5.4.
47. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1)(3), at 1488. 'The Submitter must include,
with the submission, copies of any relevant correspondence with the relevant authori-
ties. The relevant authorities are the agencies of the government responsible under
the law of the Party for the enforcement of the environmental law in question."
Guidelines, supra note 40, § 5.5.
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If the Secretariat determines that a submission meets the
requirements mentioned above, it shall then determine whether
the submission merits requesting a response from the govern-
ment that those making the submission allege is failing to
enforce its environmental laws.4"
In deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat
shall be guided by whether:
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organi-
zation making the submission;49
(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other
submissions, raises matters whose further study in this
process would advance the goals of [the NAAEC];5 °
(c) private remedies available under the [given country's]
laws have been pursued;5 and
48. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(2), at 1488.
49. Section 7.3 of the submission guidelines establishes that:
In considering whether the submission alleges harm to the person or
organization making the submission, the Secretariat will consider such
factors as whether:
a. the alleged harm is due to the asserted failure to effectively enforce
environmental law; and
b. the alleged harm relates to the protection of the environment or
the prevention of danger to human life or health (but not related to
worker safety or health).
Guidelines, supra note 40, § 7.3.
50. The objectives of the NAAEC are to
(a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the
territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future genera-
tions;
(b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually
supportive environmental and economic policies;
(c) increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect,
and enhance the environment, including wild flora and fauna;
(d) support the environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA;
(e) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers;
(f) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of envi-
ronmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
(g) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and
regulations;
(h) promote transparency and public participation in the development of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies;
(i) promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures;
and
(j) promote pollution prevention policies and practices.
NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 1, at 1483.
51. No definition of "pursuit" is provided in the Guidelines; they state only that
"[a]s set forth in Article 14(2) of the Agreement, the Secretariat will, in making that
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(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media
reports. 2
In its response, the government accused of failing to enforce
its environmental laws must advise the Secretariat whether the
matter raised in the submission is the "subject of a pending
judicial or administrative procedure, in which case the Secretar-
iat shall proceed no further."53 The response should be provid-
ed to the Secretariat within thirty days (sixty days in excep-
tional circumstances) of receipt of the Secretariat's notification
that the submission merits a response from the party.54
If the Secretariat determines that, in light of the response
provided by the government in question, the submission war-
rants development of a factual record, the Secretariat must in-
form the Council and provide reasons for its decision.55 The
Secretariat is required to prepare a factual record "if the Coun-
cil, by a two-thirds vote, instructs it to do so."" For the devel-
opment of the factual record, "the Secretariat shall consider any
information furnished by a party and may consider... [other]
information: (a) that is publicly available; (b) submitted by
interested [nongovernmental] organizations or persons; (c) sub-
determination [of whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Par-
ty], be guided by whether . . . private remedies available under the Party's law have
been pursued." Guidelines, supra note 40, § 7.2.
52. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(2), at 1488 (footnotes added). According to sec-
tion 7.4 of the Guidelines: "In considering whether a response from the Party con-
cerned should be requested when the submission is drawn exclusively from mass
media reports, the Secretariat will determine if other sources of information relevant
to the assertion in the submission were reasonably available to the Submitter."
Guidelines, supra note 40, § 7.4.
53. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(3), at 1488. A judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding is defined under the NAAEC as
(a) a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative action pursued by
the Party in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law. Such ac-
tions comprise: mediation; arbitration; the process of issuing a license,
permit or authorization; seeking an assurance of voluntary compliance or
a compliance agreement; seeking sanctions or remedies in an administra-
tive or judicial forum; or the process of issuing an administrative order;
and
(b) an international dispute resolution proceeding to which the Party is
party.
Id. art. 45(3), at 1495.
54. See id. art. 14(3), at 1488.
55. See id. art. 15(1), at 1488.
56. Id. art. 15(2), at 1488.
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mitted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee; or (d) developed
by the Secretariat or by independent experts."57
The Secretariat must first submit a draft factual record to
the Council. Any party then has forty-five days to provide com-
ments on the accuracy of the draft.5" The Secretariat may in-
corporate those comments and resubmit the document to the
Council, which within sixty days following the submission and
by a two-thirds vote, may make the final factual record avail-
able to the public.59 All of the information regarding submis-
sions of enforcement matters is accessible to the public and
available through the Registry of Submissions kept by the Sec-
retariat at the CEC headquarters."
57. Id. art. 15(4), at 1489.
58. See id. art. 15(5), at 1489.
59. See id. art. 15(6)-(7), at 1489.
60. The CEC Registry of Submissions on Enforcement matters is available on-
line in English, French, and Spanish at <http//www.cec.org>. The registry contains
the following information:
a. [A] list of all the submissions including:
(i) the name of the Submitter and the name of the Party addressed in
each submission;
(ii) a summary of the matter addressed in the submission that initi-
ated the process, including a brief description of the asserted failure(s)
to effectively enforce environmental law;
(iii) the name and citation of the law in question;
b. a summary of the response provided by the Party, if any;
c. a summary of the notifications to the Submitter, including that:
(i) a given submission does not meet the criteria set forth in Article
14(1) of the Agreement;
(ii) a response is requested from the Party concerned;
(iii) the Secretariat has determined that no response from the Party is
merited;
(iv) the Council has instructed the Secretariat not to prepare a factual
record;
(v) the final factual record has been provided to the Council;
(vi) the Council has decided not to make the factual record available
to the public;
d. the Council's decision on the preparation of a factual record; and
e. the Council's decision regarding whether the factual record will be
made publicly available.
Guidelines, supra note 40, § 15.1.
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C. An Evaluation of the Process
The Citizen's Submission process has been carefully analyzed
by different scholars as well as by environmental practitio-
ners.6 There is common agreement that it represents a crucial
advance for the involvement of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in the North American environmental dialogue." Nev-
ertheless, the fact that the process does not provide for a judi-
cial decision, but for an informative clarification, in the form of
a factual report resulting in the absence of a direct remedy, ex-
poses a serious shortcoming of the procedure.
Another weakness in the Citizen's Submission process is the
fact that the factual record "cannot include an evaluation or
judgment by the Secretariat despite the numerous NAAEC
references to the necessity of effective enforcement of environ-
mental laws."' It is clear that the only value of a factual re-
cord "lies in its impact on public opinion and the indirect pres-
sure it puts on parties both to comply with their own environ-
mental laws and to initiate new legislation."' In some cases, a
factual record may prompt a party to the agreement "to initiate
procedures for formal dispute settlement."65
In other words, in order to actually force a party to abide by
its own environmental law, the dispute resolution process pro-
vided for in Part V of the NAAEC must be initiated.66 Howev-
er, as mentioned in Part II.A, this mechanism is limited to
"situation[s] involving workplaces, firms, companies, or sectors
that produce goods or provide services" that are traded, pro-
duced, or provided between the territories of the parties. 7
Therefore, in those cases where an Article 14 submission is not
related to a trade and environmental issue, which, for example,
61. See, e.g., Kuma, Milner & Petsonk, supra note 5, at 123.
62. See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 4, at 165.
63. Id. at 158.
64. Noemi Gal-Or, Multilateral Trade and Supranational Environmental Protec-
tion: The Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well Defined Role, 9 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L.
REV. 53, 92 (1996).
65. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU; supra note 4, at 158.
66. See NAAEC, supra note 2, arts. 22-23, at 1490.
67. Id. art. 24, at 1490.
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was the case in the "Cozumel Submission,"" the possibility
that the factual record can provide probative value in the pro-
ceedings of a party-to-party dispute resolution case would be
very limited. Also, as mentioned earlier, to initiate the party-to-
party dispute resolution mechanism, it is necessary to allege a
persistent pattern of nonenforcement.69
The involvement of the different parties during the process
has also captured the attention of those interested in the
Citizen's Submission procedure. Critics note that the involve-
ment of the submitter ends at the second stage of the process
when the Secretariat decides whether to request a party's re-
sponse. The submitter is not allowed to see or comment on the
party's response, and does not have access to the draft factual
record. ' ° This situation puts the submitter in an inferior posi-
tion in which he must rely on the Secretariat to pursue the
case.' In cases where a submission involves a third party,
such as in the "Cozumel Submission" where many of the allega-
tions made by the submitters affected a company developing a
cruise ship pier project, 2 these "affected parties" do not have
any involvement at all during the process. They can only pro-
vide information to the Secretariat for the development of the
factual record.'
The absence of time limits for the Secretariat throughout the
submission process, in contrast to the time limits imposed on
the submitter and on the responding party, has also been criti-
cized by some legal specialists." However, because the
Secretariat's compilation process may be complicated in some
cases, the imposition of time limits might prove counterproduc-
tive. Only by future amendments to NAAEC can the above
limitations on the Citizen's Submission process be corrected.
68. See infra Part III.
69. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 22, at 1490.
70. See NAAEC, supra note 2, arts. 14-15, at 1488-89; Guidelines, supra note 40.
71. See Gal-Or, supra note 64, at 75.
72. See infra Part III.
73. See Guidelines, supra note 40, §§ 11, 12. Regarding notification of individual
firms that have been named in a submission, the Guidelines state that: "[w]hen a
submission received by the Secretariat names an individual or entity, the Party con-
cerned may notify that individual or entity of the existence of that submission." Id. §
16.3.
74. See Gal-Or, supra note 64, at 75.
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III. THE COZUMEL SUBMISSION
The Cozumel submission represents a good example of both
the potential that Article 14 has as a means to promote
environmental law enforcement in North America, as well as
the loopholes and limitations that the mechanism suffers from
in practice.
The submission dealt with an alleged failure of enforcement
of environmental laws in Mexico. Three Mexican nongovern-
mental organizations, the Mexican Center for Environmental
Law, the Committee for the Protection of Natural Resources,
and the International Group of One Hundred presented the
submission to the Secretariat of the CEC on January 18,
1996.7" These organizations alleged failure on the part of the
Mexican environmental authorities to effectively enforce envi-
ronmental impact assessment law with regard to a port ter-
minal project on the island of Cozumel.7"
According to the submitters, the failure to enforce environ-
mental laws was harming the Parafso coral reef. The Secretari-
at of the CEC requested a response to the submission from the
Government of Mexico, and in light of this response, informed
the Council that the submission warranted developing a factual
record. The Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project
in Cozumel, Quintana Roo was released to the public on Octo-
ber 24, 1997. 77
The Cozumel submission resulted in the first factual record
prepared and released to the public by the Secretariat of the
CEC. The following analysis examines the way the Cozumel
submission was processed by the Secretariat, the significant
issues raised by the parties during the process, and the rele-
vant facts presented by the Secretariat with respect to the main
75. Submission, CEC Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters SEM-96-
001 (Jan. 18, 1996).
76. All quotations related to the submission, the Mexican government's response,
and the facts presented by the Secretariat have been drawn from the English version
of the Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, Quintana
Roo, Secretariat of the CEC, Factual Record No. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Cozumel Factu-
al Record].
77. See id.
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allegations made by both the submitters and the Mexican envi-
ronmental authorities.
A. The Submission and the Response of the Mexican
Environmental Authorities
The central issue raised by the three Mexican environmental
groups related to the scope and magnitude of the port terminal
project.78 The submitters alleged that the Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) presented by the project's developer was
incomplete because the "Cruise Ship Pier Project" being built on
the island formed an indivisible part of a port terminal, which
constituted a larger-scale project than what was addressed in
the EIS.79 In other words, the submitters alleged that the pro-
ject was being "segmented," and that this segmentation consti-
tuted a failure to enforce Article 28 of the General Law of Eco-
logical Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (LGEE)"
and Article 42 of the Law of Ports.81 The Law of Ports defines
"terminal" as: "a unit inside or outside a [p]ort, comprising
works, installations, and surface areas, including a water zone,
which permits the relevant port operation to be fully per-
formed."
8 2
The Mexican authorities claimed that "'the port terminal
comprises distinct projects; the project which involve[d] the
construction and operation of the pier complie[d] with environ-
mental impact requirements pursuant to the Environmental
Impact Statement for the "Cruise Ship Pier in Cozumel, Quinta
na Roo" project, presented in August 1990."'s Mexico also ar-
gued that competent authorities evaluated the environmental
impact of the works planned, and that the Ministry of Commu-
nications and Transportation authorized the cruise ship pier.'
78. See id. at 3-4.
79. See id.
80. LEY GENERAL DEL EQuILIBRIO ECOL6GIco Y DE PROTECCI6N AL AMBIENTE
[L.G.E.E.] art. 28 (Mex.), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Mxenv File (General
Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection).
81. LEY DE PUERTOS, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (1993) (Mex.).
82. Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 76, at 3 n.3.
83. Id. at 8.
84. See id. at 8-9.
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Submitters further alleged that the "Port Terminal" was
"'related to an adjacent "Real Estate Tourist Development Pro-
ject'" that would be built by the company and that the EIS
presented did not take into account the cumulative environmen-
tal impact of this development.85 With respect to this allega-
tion, the environmental authorities responded that "there is no
real estate development as suggested by the Submitters, and
that the onshore works referred to by the Submitters constitute
only complementary elements of the pier described in the 1993
Concession. '
Regarding the authorizations of the project, the submitters
alleged a breach of subsection (e) of the Fifth Condition of the
Port Terminal Concession (the Concession) that was granted to
the company. Subsection (e) of the Concession stated that
"'within a period of no more than three months from the date
of the granting of [the] Concession (July 22, 1993) [the develop-
er] must present ... [a] Report on environmental impact of the
construction and operation of the Terminal.'""
When the environmental groups presented their submission
to the CEC on January 18, 1996, there was no EIS for the
construction and operation of the terminal." The Mexican gov-
ernment argued that the Concession granted to the developer
by the Ministry of Communications and Transportation only
authorized the works of the pier, and that the Fifth Condition
of the Concession was subject to the fulfillment of other condi-
tions, particularly the First Condition (requiring the donation of
land by the developer of the project to the Federal Govern-
ment).8 9
With respect to the location of the cruise ship pier, the
submitters alleged that it was located "'within a protected natu-
ral area ... subject to special legal protection,"' known as the
"Refuge for the protection of marine flora and fauna of the
western coast of Cozumel."0 The submitters argued that the
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id. at 5.
88. See id. at 5, 10.
89. See id. at 10.
90. Id. at 6.
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location of the pier within the protected natural area constitut-
ed a failure to enforce the decree that established the refuge, as
well as a failure to enforce Articles 38, 54 and 83 of the
LGEE.9" The Mexican authorities responded that "'the pier
construction project has nothing to do with the subject matter
of the [d]ecree,'" and that the purpose of the decree was limited
to prohibit commercial and sport fishing.
2
The submitters also alleged "'that the land on which the
Project [would] be constructed and operate[d did] not lie within
a zone designated for "port use.""'93 This, they argued, consti-
tuted a failure to enforce the Declaration of Uses and Reserves
of the Municipality of Cozumel, Quintana Roo.94 The Mexican
government responded that: "'the authority's acts do not contra-
vene . . . [the Declaration of Uses and Reserves of the Munic-
ipality of Cozumel], since ... the project's land development
falls within ... a lot designated for high-density tourist
use.'
95
Furthermore, the response of the Mexican environmental
authorities questioned the decision made by the Secretariat of
the CEC to accept the submission and request their response.96
They rejected the competence of the CEC to deal with the case,
alleging that the issues raised in the submission were based on
acts which "took place prior to the NAAEC entering into
force."97 In other words, they alleged that NAAEC was being
applied retroactively.
The Secretariat recognized before the Council of the CEC
that NAAEC's Article 47 (Entry into Force) contained no "inten-
tions, explicit or implied, conferring retroactive effect on the
operation of Article 14.""s Nevertheless, the Secretariat argued
91. See id.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 6.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 11.
96. See id. at 7.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Recommendation of the Secretariat to Council for the development of a Factual
Record in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, CEC Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters
SEM-96-001 (June 7, 1996) (visited Nov. 27, 1998) <http'/www.cec.org/templates/reg-
istrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=15&format=l> [hereinafter Cozumel Rec-
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that events occurring prior to the entry into force of NAAEC
may have created "conditions or situations which give rise to
current enforcement obligations ... [and which] may be rele-
vant when considering an allegation of a present, continuing
failure to enforce environmental law."99 The Secretariat quoted
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which provides that:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in
relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation
which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force
of the treaty with respect to that party.10
The Secretariat believed that subsection (e) of the Fifth Condi-
tion of the Concession created a situation "that had not ceased"
to exist.'0 '
In their response to the submission, the Mexican authorities
also alleged that the submitters lacked proof of direct harm and
that they failed to meet the requirements of Article 14(2)(a) of
the NAAEC.' ° The Secretariat argued that:
In considering harm, the Secretariat notes the importance
and character of the resource in question .... While -the
Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not have al-
leged the particularized, individual harm required to ac-
quire legal standing to bring suit in some civil proceedings
in North America, the especially public nature of marine re-
sources bring the submitters within the spirit and intent of
Article 14 of NAAEC.'
It is clear that the Secretariat met the expectations of many
environmental groups by adopting a broad interpretation of
Article 14(2)(a), and "by recognizing the public nature of envi-
ommendation].
99. Id.
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
101. Cozumel Recommendation, supra note 98, § IV.A.
102. Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 76, at 7.
103. Cozumel Recommendation, supra note 98 § ]V.B.
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ronmental concerns and harms as well as the right of the pub-
lic interest to legal standing.
" 10 4
The Mexican government also claimed "that the submitters
did not exhaust [local] remedies available under the Mexican
legislation.""5 The Secretariat, however, concluded that "the
submitters attempted to pursue local remedies, primarily by
availing themselves of the 'denuncia popular' administrative
procedure." °6
Article 14(2)(c) is also prone to controversy. In general terms,
NAAEC allows citizens of any of the three countries to present
a submission under Article 14(1)(f), alleging that any of the
three governments is not effectively enforcing its environmental
laws. ' This raises the unprecedented possibility that a citi-
zen of Canada or the United States, for example, may allege
before the CEC that the Mexican government is not enforcing
its own environmental laws.
To request a response from the government in question, how-
ever, the Secretariat must establish that the submitters "pur-
sued local remedies" before presenting their submission."8 The
first ambiguity lies in the term "pursue," which, as opposed to
"exhaust," does not have a clear and established legal defini-
tion. Neither the NAAEC nor the Guidelines provide any help
in this matter, thereby leaving the responsibility placed flatly
on the shoulders of the Secretariat.
Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for a foreign citizen to acquire legal standing in the juris-
diction where the alleged failure to enforce is taking place. In
our example, how could a Canadian NGO "pursue local reme-
dies" in Mexico? Again, the NAAEC and the Guidelines provide
no answer.
104. Gal-Or, supra note 64, at 89.
105. Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 76, at 7.
106. Cozumel Recommendation, supra note 98, § IV.B. On June 22, 1995, the
submitters filed a "denuncia popular" to the relevant authorities, stating all the is-
sues mentioned in the submission. The "denuncia popular" is an administrative proce-
dure to request the competent authorities to take appropriate action to enforce envi-
ronmental laws to avoid environmental harm.
107. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1)(f), at 1488.
108. See id. art. 14(2), at 1488.
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B. Facts Presented by the Secretariat
The facts presented by the Secretariat in the final factual
record help clarify the controversial issues regarding the
Cozumel Submission. However, the report does not include an
evaluation or judgment by the Secretariat with respect to those
facts and allegations made by the submitters. The reader of the
factual record must draw his or her own conclusions as to
whether the Mexican environmental authorities effectively en-
forced their environmental laws.
This lack of evaluation or judgment on the part of the Secre-
tariat is a serious flaw in the NAAEC. Even if the Secretariat
finds facts that point to possible failures to enforce, or even
blatant contradictions in the responses submitted by a govern-
ment, the Secretariat cannot take a side, allowing it to do little
more than quote the position of each Party. For example, with
respect to the controversial issue of the scope and magnitude of
the Cozumel project, the factual record prepared by the Secre-
tariat presents a definition of "pier for tourist cruise ships"
contained in the Instructions for the Concession of Piers for
Tourist Cruise Ships and Specialized Cargo Terminals pub-
lished by the Mexican Port Authority in September 1989.09
This definition establishes that "[pliers for tourist cruise ships
are defined as a grouping of maritime and land installations
intended for the mooring of vessels and for the provision of pas-
senger services to tourist cruise ships."" ° Was this definition
legally binding? The Secretariat cannot make this decision.
Regarding the existence of related projects and the lack of
assessment of cumulative impacts, the Secretariat presented the
following fact in the Cozumel Factual Record:
[O]n August 10, 1990, in a... document signed by the
Minister of Communications and Transport, the [Ministry of
Communications and Transportation] approved a request to
[the developer] to build and operate a passenger terminal
109. See Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 76, at 15.
110. Id.
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and cruise ship pier. The document states that "the project
is complemented by a 43.3 hectares real estate tourist de-
velopment.""'
This fact clearly contradicts the Mexican government's response
that there was no real estate development related to the
project."'
With respect to authorizations, the Secretariat states in the
Cozumel Factual Record that "[als of February 10, 1997, accord-
ing to information presented by [the developer] .. . the [F]irst
[C]ondition of the Concession granted by ... [the Ministry of
Communications and Transportation] had not been fulfilled.
Consequently, the donation of the land had not taken place, the
last requirement for fulfilling this First Condition.""' This is
relevant because the Mexican environmental authorities argued
in their response that the Concession granted by the Ministry
of Communications and Transportation only authorized the
works of the pier."4 They also argued that the Fifth Condition
of the Concession'15 was subject to the fulfillment of other
conditions, particularly the First Condition, requiring donation
of land by the developer of the project to the federal govern-
ment.
1 6
Nevertheless, in accordance with the Cozumel Factual Record,
on December 20, 1996, the environmental authorities "autho-
rized ... [the company] to construct and operate the works"
comprising the Port Terminal (inland works)." 7 In other
words, the First Condition, which in accordance with the Mexi-
can government's response conditioned the environmental ap-
proval of the project, was not fulfilled before the Mexican envi-
ronmental authorities approved the EIS of the inland works of
the project.
111. Id. at 17.
112. See id. at 10.
113. Id. at 25.
114. See id. at 10.
115. The Fifth Condition stated that, within a period of no more than 'three
months from the date of the granting of [the Concession (July 22, 1993), the develop-
er] must present . . . [a r]eport on environmental impact of the construction and
operation of the Terminal." Id. at 20.
116. See id. at 10.
117. Id. at 24.
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With respect to the controversy related to the location of the
project, the Secretariat discovered two interesting and apparent-
ly contradictory facts. First, on May 11, 1990, the environmen-
tal authorities informed the developer that the Cruise Ship Pier
Project could not be authorized because it was "situated within
the Protected Natural Coral Reef area of Cozumel" and that
construction would negatively impact various threatened coral
species."8 Second, seven months later on December 19, 1990,
the same environmental authorities authorized the Project with-
out making any reference to the fact that the project was locat-
ed in a protected natural area."'
Finally, regarding the land use controversy, the Secretariat
also found relevant facts that would warrant a closer legal
opinion.2 According to the Declaration of Uses and Reserves
of the Municipality of Cozumel, "maritime installations that
could affect coral reefs" are prohibited in areas designated for
"High-Density Tourist Use.""2 In its response, the Govern-
ment acknowledged that the zone in which the construction of
the project (the cruise ship pier) was being carried out, was
designated for "High-Density Tourism."" The EIS presented
by the company estimated that "potentially the most significant
damage during construction [of the pier] would be neighboring
coral reef communities ... ."' Nevertheless, the environmen-
tal authorities validated the authorization of the project, claim-
ing that its relocation "would allow a reduction in the impacts
[to the coral reef] so that no more than [three] percent of the
group is affected."' Once again, the Secretariat was not al-
lowed to ponder if the municipal prohibition was total and
absolute, or if affecting "[three] percent of the group"'25 did
not entail a violation of the aforementioned Declaration.
118. Id. at 31.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 33.
122. See id. at 11.
123. Id. at 33.
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The mechanisms created under NAFTA, in particular
NAAEC, constitute an important effort by Canada, Mexico, and
the United States to address the old dilemma of how to make
development, in this case the increase of trade flow, compatible
with protection of the environment. NAFTA-which was consid-
ered to be a strictly commercial matter when negotiations be-
gan-was extended to include the legitimate environmental
concerns expressed by different sectors of the three North
American societies. The NAAEC, one of the outcomes of this
complex process, has become an important example of regional
cooperation and has helped make NAFTA what some have
described as the "greenest" trade agreement in history.
Moreover, the trilateral character of these new mechanisms,
including the CEC, creates great opportunities for regional
cooperation. Also, it contributes to increasing public participa-
tion in environmental decisions through the JPAC. This alone
can be considered a step forward in the parties' efforts towards
achieving sustainable development in North America.
The NAAEC can be considered unique in the sense that it
establishes links and commitments for the protection of a
shared regional environment. This cooperation is noteworthy
because it occurs between two highly industrialized countries,
the United States and Canada, and a developing country,
Mexico.
Undoubtedly, one of the major aspects of the NAAEC is the
opportunity it creates, through Articles 14 and 15, for nongov-
ernmental organizations and individual citizens with no specific
affiliation, to demand that their respective governments effec-
tively enforce environmental laws, and to publicly denounce
those governments when such enforcement does not occur.
Through this procedure, the Secretariat of the CEC is empow-
ered, within significant limits, to investigate the diligence of the
parties in enforcing domestic environmental legislation. The
Citizen's Submission process is undoubtedly an interesting and
innovative procedure that allows citizens, NGOs, and even resi-
dents of North America to perform a role as watchdogs of the
environmental performance of the three governments. However,
this procedure suffers from many of the flaws emphasized by
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its critics. Because it does not provide for any private direct
action and entails no actual enforcement, its efficiency is limit-
ed to the political pressure generated by the press and the
public. Its role may be to embarrass governments into compli-
ance.
The Cozumel Submission, the first such submission that
resulted in a factual record, is a good example for measuring
the practical impact of the Citizen's Submission process. When
the submission was presented, and particularly when the Secre-
tariat requested a response from the Mexican government, it
captured the attention of the media in the three countries. The
media attention may have been due to two facts: it was the
first submission to generate a factual record, and it dealt with
an alleged failure of enforcement by Mexico. During the negoti-
ations of the NAFTA and the NAAEC, different parties severely
questioned both Mexican environmental laws and their enforce-
ment by the government.
Later, Mexico's thirty-six page response to the submission
captured the attention of environmental groups, legal special-
ists, and the media. This created a spirited debate over
Mexico's allegations that the agreement could not be applied
"retroactively," that the submission exceeded the jurisdiction of
the CEC, and that the submitters did not certify the damages
they suffered nor exhaust local remedies.
In fact, some environmental groups believe that the declara-
tion of the Cozumel Reef as a protected natural area" was a
direct result of the submission." 7 The Mexican government
severely questioned the role of the Secretariat, both in its re-
sponse to the submission and in press conferences held by envi-
ronmental authorities, including the Minister.' When the
three members of the Council cast the official vote, however,
the Mexican government declared that it would act in a spirit
of solidarity and cooperation, and joined the United States and
126. The reef was officially designated a National Marine Park on July 19, 1990.
127. Gustavo Alanis, President of the Mexican Center for Environmental Law and
one of the submitters of the Cozumel Submission, has made such a statement on
several occasions.
128. See Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 76, at 7.
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Canada in instructing the Secretariat to develop a factual
record.
The submission was presented in January of 1996, and al-
most two years passed before the final Cozumel Factual Record
was released to the public on October of 1997. By then, the
initial interest of environmental groups and the media had all
but vanished. Very few newspapers in North America covered
the release of the report or the reaction by the parties involved.
In Mexico, it practically went unnoticed.
The submitters held a press conference and distributed a
document with their interpretation of the Cozumel Factual
Record, alleging that "it proved failure by the part of the Mexi-
can environmental authorities to effectively enforce environmen-
tal law."'29 On the other hand, some Mexican officials have
said off-the-record that they are "pleased" with the Cozumel
Factual Record because they believe that, even if it reaches no
conclusions, it supports their position. Meanwhile, the JPAC
has said nothing, and the Council remains silent to this day.
For the CEC, with the release of the Cozumel Factual Record,
the process is terminated.
One might wonder whether the procedure served its purpose
and if the public is better informed as a result. The truth is
that the procedure had very little impact on the environmental
community, and none whatsoever on the tourist project in
Cozumel that led to the submission.
The fact that the record does not provide any judgment or
evaluation regarding the allegations made by the submitters
might have disappointed the public. Indeed, the efficiency of the
procedure was compromised as the political momentum faded
during the long process. In any case, the critics of the CEC who
claimed that it was born with no teeth seem to have scored a
point.
If the NAAEC is to fulfill its potential as a model for promot-
ing international solutions to environmental and developmental
problems, and as a mechanism for fostering law enforcement in
129. The Mexican Center for Environmental Law, The International Group of One
Hundred & The Committee for the Protection of Natural Resources, Press Release
(Oct. 30, 1997) (Mex.).
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this field, it will be essential to encourage and to improve the
involvement of civil society in the three countries.
One first step may be to revise the Citizen's Submission
process to eliminate loopholes and to redefine its purpose and
scope. These changes would help convince concerned parties
that it will be worth their time and resources to pursue a sub-
mission on enforcement matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC.

